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Abstract
This paper provides a mathematical framework based on the prin-
ciple of invariance [1] to classify institutions in two paradigms accord-
ing to the way in which credit, debit and funding adjustments are cal-
culated: accounting and management perspectives. This conceptual
classification helps to answer questions such as: In which paradigm
each institution sits (point of situation)? Where is the market consen-
sus and regulation pointing to (target point)? What are the implica-
tions, pros and cons of switching perspective to align with future con-
sensus (design of a transition)? An improved solution of the principle
of invariance equations is presented to calculate these metrics avoiding
approximations and irrespective of the discounting curve used in Front
Office systems. The perspective is changed by appropriate selection
of inputs always using the same calculation engine. A description of
balance sheet financing is presented along with the justification of the
funding curves used for both perspectives.
Disclaimer: the views expressed in this article are exclusively
from the author and do not necessarily represent the views of neither
Bank Santander nor its affiliates.
1 Introduction
Counterparty Credit Risk in financial derivatives and funding cost have in-
creasingly become topics of research since the credit crisis in 2008. After the
∗Head of XVA Model Validation, Bank Santander, Av. Cantabria s/n, 28660 Boadilla
del Monte, Spain, aelices@gruposantander.com.
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default of Lehman Brothers the assumption that financial institutions could
not default was no longer accepted. This hypothesis has been introduced in
the existing pricing framework by using the previous risk free pricing plus
a number of adjustments: the CVA (Credit Value Adjustment) to take into
account the default of the counterparty and the DVA (Debit Value Adjust-
ment) to account for the default of the institution from which the pricing
is carried out (from now on “the bank”). To reduce counterparty credit
risk, collateralization was generalized among big institutions in the following
years.
Collateralization came for the over-the-counter market in the form of
variation margin to cover the liable mark-to-market in case of default. Addi-
tionally, regulators have fostered closing operations through central clearing
counterparties which require posting an additional initial margin to cover the
market variation during the margin period of risk (usually two weeks) from
counterparty default to liquidation. Regulators have also required higher
amounts of initial margin posting for over-the-counter markets to foster clos-
ing operations with central clearing counterparties. Collateral can be cash or
other type of liquid assets (e.g. bonds, Equity, etc). This mechanics required
funding this collateral and the need for additional adjustments such as the
FVA or Funding Value Adjustment, to account for the funding costs and
benefits of collateral or the MVA, Margin Value Adjustment, to address the
cost of funding of initial margin. Finally, the last adjustment which has been
proposed is the Capital Value Adjustment or KVA which accounts for the
funding costs of capital required by regulators. All these adjustments are all
denominated under the acronym XVA.
Since 2008, a continuous debate has taken place among institutions and
regulators on how these adjustments should be calculated and reported to
comply with accounting standards and to properly foster internal manage-
ment. After more than a decade, the CVA has settled down as an accepted
adjustment, DVA and FVA are still under debate and the rest are still far
from being standardized.
Two major paradigms have been discussed around XVA and in particular
about FVA since 2012. The first one, mainly advocated by Hull and White in
[2], considers that the value of a firm defined as the shareholder and creditor
value does not depend on the funding strategy of the institution according to
Modigliani-Miller theorem [3]. Therefore the FVA should be zero, derivative
prices are symmetric (as so CVA and DVA are) and obey the law of one
price. This paradigm can well be used for accounting fair value. Burgard
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and Kjaer study the impact of derivatives and their corresponding funding
positions in the balance sheet upon the issuer default (see [4] and [5]). They
have also proposed ways to mitigate this impact so that funding adjustments
can be dropped.
The second paradigm advocates for the inclusion of the FVA in derivative
prices which are charged to final customers in order not to reduce shareholder
value for the cost of collateral funding of hedges associated with unsecured
operations. This paradigm implies wealth transfer from shareholders to se-
nior creditors as the valuation of the extra funds required from the latter
to fund derivatives (monetized when the bank defaults) equals the funding
value adjustment charged to customers (see [6]). This paradigm is more
aligned with what practitioners and institutions consider how the manage-
ment should be carried out. On the other hand, the funding benefits provided
by FVA overlap with DVA profit on bank liabilities when funding benefits are
valued at the internal transfer funding rate of the bank which accounts for
the bank credit spread, already included in DVA (see for instance [8]). In or-
der to avoid this double counting, some practitioners prefer to drop DVA and
consider only FVA and others to preserve both but only the liquidity compo-
nent of the internal funding spread in the FVA. In fact, this latter approach
is a point in between both paradigms because avoiding double counting be-
tween DVA and FVA allows both adjustments to live together providing a
symmetric price between the counterparty and the bank. This price would
be compatible with the law of one price and the accounting regulation (the
essence of the first paradigm).
This paper does not provide additional support for either paradigm but
simply pursues to accommodate both approaches into a common framework
which can be “configured” to align with the first paradigm, the “accounting
perspective” or with the second paradigm, the “management perspective”.
The choice of perspective will depend on the decision of the senior man-
agement of each institution which will progressively accommodate with the
evolution of the market consensus (see section 11) and the regulatory require-
ments (see section 10).
This paper has four major contributions. The first one provides a frame-
work, based on the principle of invariance [1], which conceptually allows clas-
sifying institutions into these two paradigms in relation with credit, debit and
funding value adjustment calculation: an accounting and an economic man-
agement perspective with intermediate transitions among them (see sections
10 and 11). This classification allows a conceptual identification of which
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perspective each institution sits on, where is the market consensus settling
down (section 11 summarizes the consensus surveys [9], [10] and [11]), to
which perspective the regulation is pointing to (section 13), what are the
implications, advantages and disadvantages of moving from one perspective
to the other (see section 12) and the prospective difficulties of institutions to
adjust to the tendency of market consensus and regulation to the manage-
ment perspective (see section 14). This conceptual mindset provides a route
guide to realize about the current point of situation, the target point, how
to design a transition from one to the other and allowing reporting the stage
of completion of this transition.
The second contribution provides an improved solution of the CVA/DVA
equation with funding based on the mathematical framework of the principle
of invariance [1] (it is reviewed in sections 5 and 6). This improved solution
eliminates a circular dependence which appears in the original equation (see
sections 8 and 9). This avoids some approximations which indeed violate
the condition of the principle of invariance given by equation (14). In addi-
tion, this solution calculates the XVA adjustments in terms of the exposures
discounted with whatever rate is available in the system as presented in equa-
tions (25) to (27) where no conversion or approximation needs to be carried
out.
The third contribution is that the mathematical framework is common
for both perspectives. Each of them is defined by a choice of a set objects of
selection (see section 7). This allows a smooth transition from one perspective
to another without having to implement changes in the calculation engine.
Finally, the fourth contribution justifies how funding rates can be esti-
mated under the assumption that the Financial area is not a profit center.
For the accounting perspective the internal funding rate is related with the
average liquidity spread of the bonds issued by the institution. On the other
hand, for the management perspective the internal funding rate is an average
yield of the issued bonds.
The paper starts with a tour around the management of balance sheet
financing from a descriptive point of view. This includes a description of the
functions of the financial area and the financial management control (section
2.1), the bond issuance department (section 2.2), the short term desk (section
2.3) and the Securities Financing desk (section 2.4). Section 3 illustrates with
a simple example how to estimate the internal FTP (Fund Transfer Pricing)
rate based on the bond issuance activity and various hypotheses which will be
thereafter aligned for the derivation of the appropriate FTP rate depending
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on the perspective adopted (either accounting or management).
Section 4 discusses the interaction among credit, debit and funding value
adjustments in terms of collateral and concludes that the best way to manage
collateral is to reach a balance between the positions which generate CVA
(unsecured assets in favour of the bank) and the positions which generate
DVA (unsecured liabilities in favour of the counterparty). This section is a
bridge from the first descriptive part of the paper and the second part with
the presentation of the mathematical framework, the two perspectives and
their interpretation and implications.
The presentation of the mathematical framework in section 7 is intro-
duced by a review and an interpretation of the principle of invariance with
and without default in sections 5 and 6. Sections 8 and 9 present the improved
solution of the invariance equations1 of section 6 with and without default
to calculate credit, debit and funding value metrics avoiding approximations
and irrespective of the discounting curve used in Front Office systems.
Sections 10 and 11 justify and motivate the accounting perspective (regu-
lation) and management perspective (hedging and market consensus). Each
one is defined by making choices for the objects of selection introduced in
the mathematical framework (section 7). Both perspectives are compared in
section 12.
Section 13 analyzes the FRTB-CVA regulation and justifies why it is
pointing to the management perspective. Finally, section 14 analyzes the
implications of the transition from the accounting to the management per-
spective and explains why there are institutions which may be reluctant to
change until the market consensus is clearly settled. Section 15 ends up with
some conclusions.
The mathematical derivations are not included in the body of the paper
but left for the appendices. Appendix A shows the derivation of the relation
between two prices discounted with two different curves. Appendix B shows
the derivation of the equations of the principle of invariance with default risk
where the invariance rate which can be arbitrarily chosen has not yet been
selected. Finally, appendix C shows the derivation of the improved solution
which breaks the circular dependence and expresses XVA metrics in terms
of the discounting used in the internal Front Office systems rather than the
invariance rate.
1Developed by Jrme Maetz, Head of XVA Front Office quant team, Santander Bank.
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2 Management of balance sheet financing
In order to properly understand how the balance sheet management of a bank
is carried out, this section briefly reviews the main areas and departments in
which this function is located: the financial area which provides structural
financing to the bank, the Issuance Department which allows dynamically
fitting the financial requirements of the bank, the Short Term desk to manage
the daily closeout of cash flows and the Securities Financing desk which
optimally manages collateral. Section 3 provides a worked example which
provides an approxiamtion of how the internal Funding Transfer Pricing may
be calculated given some hypotheses.
2.1 Financial area
The main purpose of the Financial area of a bank is to provide structural
short and long term financing to the bank. The structural financing is needed
to support the ordinary businesses of the bank and other corporate operations
for which liquidity is needed.
• Ordinary businesses of the bank: examples of this category are
credit lending (e.g. provide credit to retail/institutional customers,
mortgages, etc) derivatives, which also involve a part of liquidity lend-
ing or borrowing.
• Corporate operations: examples of corporate operations can be to
acquire or increase participatio in other entities, real state operations
or mergers.
The building blocks of the Financial area are the various areas and de-
partments which provide the services to allow raising the structural liquidity
that a bank needs in each moment:
• Financial management control: this department calculates and dis-
tributes the internal financing rates or FTP (Fund Transfer Pricing)
rate. As part of the strategic vision or the bank, some businesses may
be fostered providing lower financing rates and others mitigated with
higher financing rates. This is of course a decision of the senior man-
agement of the bank and he actual implementation of this strategic
views are carried out by this department.
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• Issuance department: this department issues corporate paper to
provide additional liquidity to close the balance of the bank so that
all financing needs are equal to the financial sources of the bank. In
general, the bank is usually organized to lack liquidity. Therefore, the
Issuance Departement keeps constantly issuing corporate paper.
• Short Term desk: provides liquidity to daily close-out cash payments
of every desk in every currency. The surplus or extra liquidity needed is
first given or provided by the Interbank lending/borrowing and there-
after by the internal liquidity of the bank for which regulatory ratios
must be satisfied.
• Securities Financing desk: this desk allows short term asset and
collateral optimization to maximize return and collateral reuse when
collateral is rehypothecable.
The management of the Financial area is carried out by collecting all the
assets and liquidity from every business of the bank. The main ways the bank
can raise money are the deposits or cash coming from the customers, Equity
and debt issuance or Central banks. All sources of liquidity are deposited in a
common account joining liquidity provided and consumed by every business.
• Equity issuance: Equity issuance is carried out only from time to
time to raise internal capital from shareholders. Preparing an Equity
issuance is a relevant event for which many market participants needs
to be coordinated (that is why Equity issuance is occasional). There
are examples in which there is a continuous Equity issuance process
such as the payment of dividends in form of stock or stock dividends.
The bank does not pay dividends and in exchange issues shares to pay
its shareholders.
• Businesses of the bank: most of the financing a bank obtains comes
from customer deposits from their retail business. The retail business
is carried out through the bank agencies and more lately through the
digital customer relationship. In addition, commercial banking (insti-
tutional customers) or corporate banking (corporates) may be other
ways of raising financing (sometimes they request for liquidity) for the
bank through special bank analysts who are specialized in bigger cus-
tomers (e.g. private banking).
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• Central banks: In some situations Central Banks or Central Bank
agencies may offer packages of cheaper financing than Capital markets.
Examples are Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO)
from the European Central Bank or excess of liquidity in various cur-
rencies lent by agencies such as SAMA (“South Arabian Monetary Au-
thority”).
• Debt issuance: there is a big range of debt which may be issued by
banks. Bonds are issued for medium and long terms with a wide range
of seniority depending on the type of credit quality. Commercial paper
is usually issued for short term and covered bonds are bonds backed by
mortgages. The issuance process is carried out continuously to match
lack of liquidity and renew expired debt.
The budget for the finance area is built one year ahead collecting the
needs and sources of liquidity from every area. This budget is calculated
from a conceptual basis. However, there are also financing operations closed
internally from the Financial area for a given time horizon with various busi-
nesses of the bank as long as they happen. This operations officially transmit
liquidity surplus or requirements so that the Financial area may coordinate
with the Issuance department the provisioning of these extra funds. There
are also situations in which the Financial area requests the desks (e.g. the
Equity desk) to coordinate a campaign to raise liquidity if they anticipate
that the Issuance department may not cope with raising the whole amount
of liquidity needed.
2.2 Issuance department
The Issuance department is the heart of the dynamic liquidity management.
This department closes out sources and needs of medium and long term
liquidity. The main objectives of the Issuance department are maintaining
regulatory ratios within appropriate levels, providing adjustments to the liq-
uidity budget (based on internal term operations closed with the Financial
area) and re-finance expiring debt to modulate in terms of current liquidity
needs or strategic views, the total amount of debt outstanding.
The regulatory ratios which are under the scrutiny of the Issuance de-
partment so that they are kept within appropriate levels (usually higher
than 100%) are the following:
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• LCR (Liquidity Coverage Ratio): liquid assets over payments in the
coming 30 days. This is the most basic short term ratio. When Lehman
Brothers collapsed in September 2008, part of the issue was that they
were getting financing from the Interbank market and it got completely
dried (no more borrowing or lending). This ratio was introduced to
avoid such situations.
• NSFR (Net Stable Funding Ratio): ratio of stable funding (e.g. lia-
bilities beyond 1 year maturity). This ratio fosters liabilities which do
not expire in such a short term as the LCR.
• TLAC (Total Loss Absorbing Capacity): this ratio assures enough
Equity and bail-in debt to pass losses to investors to avoid a government
bailout. This ratio is to avoid governments to have to take money from
tax payers to rescue financial institutions.
• MREL (Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities):
this ratio is more related with the degree of resolvability to absorb losses
and restore capital position during and after a crisis. This ratio is a
post default orderly management measure.
In order to maintain these regulatory ratios beyond 100%, the Issuance
department may have to issue various types of debt with varying maturity
and credit seniority. The hierarchy of asset quality and the corresponding
capital impacts are the following:
• Equity shares, derivative profit-and-loss not including DVA:
these are part of the CET1 (Common Equity Tier 1). Equity shares
and traded derivatives are the most liquid type of assets which can be
liquidated in the market at once. The reason why DVA and the rest
of own credit adjustments cannot be considered part of the Common
Equity Tier 1 capital arises from [18] in which the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision resolves not to recognize this type of asset as
Common Equity for the profit it provides can only be realized in case
of default of the institution.
• Commercial paper: this is a liquid debt issued by the bank to obtain
short term liquidity. In many situations, commercial paper is allowed
to be recognized as part of CET1 capital. However, there are situations
in which it is not.
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• Preferred participations: this type of debt is part of what is called
the AT1 (Additional Tier 1 capital). This is the following layer of
CET1. It is not as liquid as CET1 but it is still not considered tier 2
capital.
• Subordinated debt: this type of debt has the lowest priority within
the hierarchy of creditors in case of liquidation or bankruptcy. Subor-
dinated debt holders get paid just before stock holders. This type of
debt is part of T2 (Tier 2) capital, the second layer according to Basel
regulation. It is also counted as part of TLAC ratio.
• Senior non-preferred debt: this type of debt has higher priority in
the creditor hierarchy than subordinated debt. It is counted for the
calculation of the TLAC ratio.
• Senior preferred or unsecured debt: this is the debt at the top of
the hierarchy of creditor priority.
• Covered Bonds: these bonds are usually over collateralized by a pool
of mortgages and represent the closest debt to risk-free.
As a conclusion, the Issuance department allows raising funds to dynam-
ically manage deviations in the financing budget of the bank. Budget devi-
ations are formally acknowledged through internal term operations between
various areas of the bank and the Financial area. The wide range of debt
issued is optimized to maintain in appropriate levels a number of regulatory
ratios. The debt issuance is a continuous process which renews expired debt
and can be modulated in the long term to shape the structure of the total
debt outstanding. Depending on the liquidity of the market, the Issuance
department may have to change the strategy ahead of time to be able to cope
with the liquidity constraints of the market.
2.3 Short term desk
The short term desk daily closes out all the cash positions in every cur-
rency for the legal entity. The way in which the short term desk operates is
summarized in the following points:
• When the bank needs to carry out payments and it does not have
money, the short term desk borrows it on a daily basis from the In-
terbank market to accomplish all payments. When there is surplus of
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cash, they lend it to the Interbank market. Daily overnight interbank
lending/borrowing is carried out at OIS rate to match excess/lack of
liquidity.
• When the liquidity of the Interbank market dries out, the short term
desk takes the liquidity from the common account where all sources
of financing are collected. Daily payments can never be failed as this
would technically trigger a default. Therefore, the common account
must be there as a backup to never run out of liquidity.
• Shortage in the common account triggers debt issuance through regula-
tory ratios. When the short term desk starts to take liquidity from the
common account, this deteriorates the regulatory capital ratios. There-
fore, the Issuance department will need to issue more debt to restore
healthy levels for these ratios.
• Liquidity in currencies other than the mayor currency of the bank (e.g.
EUR for European, USD for North American or JPY for Japanese
banks) is obtained by borrowing in the major currency at the inter-
bank market OIS rate and exchanging it to the required currency by
means of foreign exchange spot or forward (very short term) operations.
Therefore, the effective rate is the OIS rate plus the cross currency basis
spread. Penetration in other currencies could make it cheaper to ob-
tain liquidity in currencies different from the major one. However, in
practice, most of the liquidity in foreign currencies is obtained through
spot/forward operations.
2.4 Securities Financing desk
This desk optimizes a pool of assets and collateral to maximize return and
match LCR (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) and collateral requirements at the
lowest possible cost. The tasks and machinery carried out by this desk are
the following:
• Asset rotation: this process consists of leveraging by exchanging high
for low quality assets for a pick-up spread and de-leveraging by getting
back the high quality assets by paying the spread back. The leveraging
process allows reusing assets received as collateral when they are not
needed to get some extra return and the de-leveraging process allows
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to rescue some assets which at a given point in time may be needed to
post as collateral or to increase regulatory ratios. Leveraging increases
return but reduces liquidity (the liquid assets are temporarily sold or
exchanged) and de-leveraging improves liquidity and LCR ratio but
reduces return.
• Asset lending/borrowing: agreed among institutions for received or
paid pick-up spread from funds or banks. This is part of the machinery
developed by the Securities Financing desk to increase support and
coverage from other institutions in case collateral or other assets may
be needed in the present or future.
• Internal operations: closed with desks or other areas of the bank
to get or request liquidity for specific terms. Sometimes the derivative
desks are fostered to get liquidity when the market situation may not be
favorable to obtain it by promoting derivative campaigns to customers
through the retail network.
• Pool of assets: the Securities Financing desk has access to an ex-
tensive pool of assets such as bonds, letters, commercial paper, Equity
assets, etc. This pool of assets has to be optimized so that the bank
can post appropriate collateral or have assets available for regulatory
ratio computation. This desk is more dynamic than the Issuance de-
partment and may help it to maintain some of the regulatory ratios
within appropriate levels on a periodic basis.
• Collateral reuse: the asset rotation by the lending/borrowing ma-
chinery allows raising the ratio of collateral reuse up to more than
80/90%. This is for the collateral which is re-hypothecable and there-
fore can be reused. Segregated or non-rehypothecable collateral cannot
be touched and it is usually kept inside a custodian entity.
• Typical operations: the range of operations which the Securities Fi-
nancing desk usually closes includes repo and reverse repo transactions,
total return swaps, security lending, futures and some options.
Some institutions reuse extra collateral coming out of liability porfolios
by posting it as initial margin. This is an example of how to reuse collateral
in an efficient way.
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3 Estimation of Fund Transfer Pricing rate
This section shows a simple and intuitive approximation to determine the
financing costs of a bank based on the bond issuance process under two
different hypotheses. The first one assumes that the bank can default and
only the recovery of the outstanding debt will be paid back to bond holders.
The second one will consider that the bank cannot default.
Consider a bank B which issues bonds on dates ti expiring on Ti with
notional Fi,t = Fi · 1{ti<t<Ti} and valued on date t at a price BBi,t:
BBi,t = Fi,t
{∫ Ti
t
prt,sQ
B
t,sr
B
ti,s
ds+ prt,TiQ
B
t,s +
∫ Ti
t
RBs p
r
t,sQ
B
t,sλ
B
t,sds
}
(1)
where rBti,t is the bond continuous coupon, R
B
s and λ
B
t are the recovery
rate and term structure of the instantaneous hazard rate on t of bank B.
Equation (2) presents the values of prt,s and Q
B
t,s which are the discount factor
(with instantaneous risk free forward rate rt,s) and survival probability from
t to s.
prt,s = exp (−
∫ s
t rt,udu) Q
B
t,s = exp (−
∫ s
t λt,udu) (2)
The liquidity obtained from issued bonds is now transferred to the deriva-
tive desks through an internal transfer bond issued by the Financial area and
sold to the desk. This bond is issued at a price Bi,t with full recovery. The
reason to consider full recovery is because both the desk and the Financial
area belong to the same bank and in case of default, all the assets of the bank
will be put together to face the recovery payments. Therefore, it does not
make sense that the desk pays only a recovery to the Financial area. Instead,
the assets held by both are used to pay the recovery to the bond holders.
The price of the internal bond is given by equation (3):
Bi,t = Fi,t
{∫ Ti
t
prt,sQ
B
t,sr
FTP
ti,s
ds+ prt,TiQ
B
t,s + 1 ·
∫ Ti
t
prt,sQ
B
t,sλ
B
t,sds
}
(3)
The Financial area balance on date t is given by equation (4) assuming
positive bond price (B > 0) for assets and negative bond price (B < 0) for
liabilities of the Financial area. With this criterion, the internal bonds are
positive (the Financial area has to get paid from the desks) and issued bonds
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are negative (the Financial area has liabilities with the bond holders). The
term T = max {Ti, i = 1 · · ·NB} refers to the longest expiry of issed debt
and NB refers to the Number of Bonds issued by the bank.
FAt =
NB∑
i=1
Bi,t−
NB∑
i=1
BBi,t =
=
∫ T
t p
r
t,sQ
B
t,s
{
NB∑
i=1
Fi,t
(
rFTPti,s − rBti,s +
(
1−RBs
)
λBt,s
)}
ds
(4)
Assuming that the total debt issued is Ft =
NB∑
i=1
Fi,t, the weight of each
bond issuance is wi,t = Fi,t/Ft and the CDS spread of the bank on date
t is CDSBt,s =
(
1−RBs
)
λBt,s, the balance given by equation (4) turns into
equation (5). For CDS quotation purposes, sometimes the recovery rate is
set to a given standard value (e.g. R = 0.4). This would mean that λBt,s has
the information of both the recovery ratio and the default intensity. However,
for the purpose of this discussion, RBs is the varying recovery rate at time
s. See that equation (5) adds and subtracts the CDS spread, CDSBti , at the
issuance time ti:
FAt = Ft ·
∫ T
t
prt,sQ
B
t,s
NB∑
i=1
wi,t
(
rFTPti,s − rBti,s + CDSBt,s
+CDSBti,s − CDSBti,s
)
ds (5)
Now the yield of the issued bond can be decomposed into OIS rate, rOISti,s ,
plus CDS spread and liquidity spread, lBti,s, according to equation (6):
rBti,s = r
OIS
ti,s
+
(
1−RBti
)
λBti,s + l
B
ti,s
= rOISti,s + CDS
B
ti,s
+ lBti,s (6)
If equation (6) is replaced in equation (5), the expression of equation (7)
is obtained where the CDSBti inside r
B
ti,s
cancels with the one from equation
(5).
FAt = Ft ·
∫ T
t
prt,sQ
B
t,s
{
NB∑
i=1
wi,t
(
rFTPti,s − rOISti,s − lBti,s
+CDSBt − CDSBti
)}
ds (7)
Finally, for the Financial area not to be a profit center, namely FAt = 0,
the following average FTP rate, r¯FTPt , follows, where the rest of average
values are provided by equation (9):
r¯FTPt,s = r¯
OIS
t,s + l¯
B
t,s + CDS
B
t − CDSBt ≈ r¯OISt,s + l¯Bt,s (8)
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r¯FTPt,s =
NB∑
i=1
wi,tr
FTP
ti,s
r¯OISt,s =
NB∑
i=1
wi,tr
OIS
ti,s
l¯Bt,s =
NB∑
i=1
wi,tl
B
ti,s
CDS
B
t =
NB∑
i=1
wi,tCDS
B
ti
(9)
The conclusions which can be extracted from equation (8) are the follow-
ing:
• Increasing CDSBt implies a profit for the Financial area because it
has to pay less recovery to the bond holders. This means that when
the credit quality of the bank deteriorates, the internal Fund Transfer
Price, FTP, gets reduced due to this profit.
• Assuming that the CDS spread is within the internal average, the FTP
rate so that the financial area is not a profit center essentially depends
on the average liquidity spread of already issued bonds, l¯Bt,s. This con-
clusion is also reached by [7] and [8].
FAt = Ft ·
∫ T
t
prt,s
NB∑
i=1
wi,t
(
rFTPti,s − rBti,s
)
ds (10)
r¯Bt,s =
NB∑
i=1
wi,tr
B
ti,s
(11)
Under the hypothesis that the bank cannot default, equation (5) turns
into equation (10) where the survival probability of the bank, QBs is equal
to 1 and the CDS spread disappears as it has been assumed that the default
intensity of the bank is zero: λBt,s = 0. For equation (10) to be zero (the
Financial area is not a profit center), it implies that the average FTP rate is
equal to the average yield of the issued bonds as given by equation (11). The
conclusion is that considering that the bank can default makes the FTP rate
dependent on liquidity and if it is assumed that the bank cannot default, the
FTP rate is the average yield of issued bonds.
4 Interaction of CVA, DVA and FVA
This section illustrates that credit, debit and funding value adjustments do
not behave independently but are closely related to each other. Having into
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account this inter-relation clarifies issues which will be reviewed later on in
sections 10 to 12.
First of all, positions that generate CVA or DVA are related with their col-
lateral requirements. CVA generating positions (those which increase CVA)
are positions with positive mark-to-market in favor of the bank (assets) which
are uncollateralized, partially collateralized or unilateral where counterparty
does not post collateral. Therefore, these positions are assets with positive
mark-to-market in favor of the bank which get hedged with collateralized
liabilities. The payments of the assets which represent the CVA generating
positions cancel the liabilities of the hedges closing out the positions. How-
ever, the bank has to post collateral for the hedges as they are collateral-
ized liabilities and this collateral cannot be taken from counterparties (those
transactions are uncollateralized). In conclusion, CVA generating positions
consume collateral.
DVA generating positions on the other hand are positions with negative
mark-to-market in favor of the counterparty (liabilities of the bank) which
are uncollateralized, partially collateralized or unilateral where the bank does
not have to post collateral. Therefore, these positions are liabilities with
negative mark-to-market in favor of the counterparty which get hedged with
collateralized assets. The payments of the hedges will cancel the liabilities
of the DVA generating positions closing out the positions. However, the
bank receives collateral from these hedges (they are collateralized assets)
which does not have to post for its liabilities (they are uncollateralized). In
conclusion, DVA generating positions provide collateral. The Equity business
is an example of this situation. This business sells options to uncollateralized
customers (e.g. corporates or private banking) and gets the premium. This
premium is invested in hedges to offset the profit and loss and the hedges
become assets for the bank. As they are collateralized, the premiums paid
to establish the hedges are given back in form of collateral. Therefore, the
overall effect of the Equity business is to provide liquidity to the bank in
form of collateral.
If re-hypothecation is assumed, the collateral provided by DVA generat-
ing positions can be reused for the CVA generating positions by means of the
Securities Financing desk. If the collateral consumed by the CVA generating
positions is higher than the collateral provided by the DVA generating posi-
tions, this collateral must be raised by the desk by borrowing money from the
Financial area. This situation is graphically presented in figure 1. If, on the
contrary, the amount of collateral provided by DVA generating positions is
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Figure 1: Balance between CVA and DVA generating positions and the Fi-
nancial area.
bigger than the collateral consumed by the CVA generating positions, there
is a surplus of collateral which the desk may try to lend to the Financial area
(however, this may not always be possible). Therefore, the most optimal
management would consist of balancing the amount of collateral provided
by DVA generating positions to fulfill the collateral comsumption by CVA
generating positions. If this balance is achieved, then neither extra collateral
is needed nor there is excess of it. Therefore, it is key to balance CVA and
DVA generating positions to minimize collateral requirements.
An imbalance between CVA and DVA generating positions leads to lack
or excess of collateral which has to be raised or remunerated producing a
financing cost/benefit. However, the following considerations have to be
taken into account in relation with this lack/excess of collateral:
• Generally speaking, funding benefit obtained from surplus of collateral
can only realize the OIS rate (no benefit) unless the collateral excess
may reduce bond issuance (this needs a lot of coordination with the
Financial area which in practice does not happen) or be reused in repos,
initial margin or other instruments through the Securities Financing
desk. This increases the return of this collateral but most likely not
as much as the internal financing cost which would be achieved by
reducing bond issuance.
• Funding costs are always realized at the internal bank financing cost
which is generally speaking rather expensive. Therefore, this situation
should be avoided as much as possible.
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• CVA/DVA imbalance increases the sensitivity to the financing curve
and the need to hedge it. For instance the situation of many banks
is an excess of CVA generating positions. These positions consume
collateral which has to be raised by the Financial area at a high cost.
Therefore, if the funding curve moves up (increase of funding cost),
there is a big loss as funding costs get higher.
• Increasing CVA rises counterparty debt which reduces internal recovery
rate (higher CDS spread). If the CVA/DVA imbalance effectively pro-
vides liquidity to the counterparties (uncollateralized) at the expense
of the Financial area, the bank increases its counterparty default risk
as these counterparties may default.
• Increasing DVA rises bank debt leading to potencial systemic risk.
From a conceptual point of view, there is nothing wrong by the fact
that the bank increases its liabilities if they will be paid back at some
point in the future. However, if the bank defaults at some time, those
liabilities may produce systemic risk. Therefore, regulators may not be
very happy about increasing liabilities of a bank.
In conclusion, the best way to manage the collateral produced by CVA
and DVA generating positions is to balance them so that neither extra col-
lateral nor surplus is needed.
5 Invariance principle without default
This section reviews the formulation of the funding invariance principle for
which the complete derivation may be found in [1]. Consider first the com-
plete set of cash flows C˜s as seen from the desk in equation (12).
dC˜r∗s = dCs +
(
r∗s − rCs
)
Msds+
(
r∗s − rFs
)
Fˆsds (12)
This equation considers a portfolio of derivatives closed with different
counterparties which exchange cash flows with the desk. The symbols in this
equation mean the following:
• Cs: cummulative process of contingent cash flows already received
(dCs > 0) from desk or paid (dCs < 0) by desk to the counterparty.
These contingent cash flows represent the payments along the life of
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derivatives. This process has a constant evolution until a cash flow
is received or paid by the desk to the counterparty. Figure 2 shows
how this process looks like. On the left hand side a positive but in-
creasing process indicates cash flows which have been received along
the life of the contract (e.g. a vanilla cap bought by the bank) from
the counterparty. On the right hand side a decreasing but negative
process represents cash flows already paid by the desk (e.g. a vanilla
cap sold by the bank) to the counterparty. The integral of this process
experiences positive jumps for coupon payments from counterparty to
desk and negative ones for payments from desk to counterparty.
• r∗s : symmetric and arbitrarily chosen money market rate at which the
desk internally borrows/lends money either to counterparties or to the
Financial area.
• Ms: re-hypothecable collateral deposited in desk (Ms¿0) or posted by
desk (Ms < 0) to counterparties. It gets remunerated at r
C
s . Figure 2
shows that for options bought by the bank (left hand side), the desk
pays a premium and gets a contract, Vt, which is positive (the coun-
terparty owes the payoff to the desk) and therefore part of that debt is
posted by the counterparty to the desk in form of collateral, Mt, which
is also positive. For options sold by the bank (right hand side), the desk
receives a premium and delivers a contract, Vt, which is negative (a li-
ability of the bank) and therefore part of that liability is posted by the
desk to the counterparty in form of collateral, Mt, which is negative.
• Fˆs: funding borrowed (Fˆs > 0) or lent (Fˆs < 0) by desk from/to Fi-
nancial area. It gets charged (Fˆs > 0) or remunerated (Fˆs < 0) the
rate rFs (possibly asymmetric: borrowing at FTP and lending at OIS).
The value of Fˆt > 0 represents the financing not covered by collateral
which is lent to the counterparty by the Financial area through the
desk. The value of Fˆt < 0 represents the financing not covered by col-
lateral which is lent by the counterparty to the Financial area through
the desk. One of the conclusions of the funding invariance principle is
that Fˆs = Vˆs −Ms, where Vˆs is the risk neutral price of the derivative
or netting set under analysis plus the valuation adjustments (collateral,
funding, credit and debit).
Equation (12) states that the increments of the total cummulative cash
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Figure 2: Cash flow process for an option bought (left) and sold (right) by
the desk to a counterparty along with sign for derivative price, Vt, collateral
balance, Mt and funding account, Fs.
flow process seen by the desk, C˜s, is equal to the increments of the cummu-
lative cash flow process of the derivative, Cs, plus the cash flows to fund the
collateral received, Ms > 0 (remunerated at the fictitious rate r
∗
s and paying
the collateral remuneration rate rCs ), plus the cash flows to fund the liquidity
given to counterparties not covered by collateral, Fˆs = Vˆs −Ms > 0, which
is remunerated at the fictitious rate, r∗s , and pays r
F
s , the remuneration rate
of the Financial area.
V r∗t = Et
[∫ T
t
pr∗t,sdCs
]
(13)
Vˆt = Et
[∫ T
t p
r∗
t,s
(
dCs + (r
∗
s − rCs )Ms + (r∗s − rFs )Fˆs
)
ds
]
= V r∗t + Et
[∫ T
t p
r∗
t,s
(
(r∗s − rCs )Ms + (r∗s − rFs )Fˆs
)
ds
] (14)
Fˆs = Vˆs −Ms (15)
The funding invariance principle [1] is obtained integrating equation (12)
multiplied by pr∗t,s, taking conditional expectation (Et [·]) and replacing equa-
tion (13) which relates the risk neutral price discounted with rate r∗, with the
cummulative process of contingent cash flows. This yields the equation (14)
of the invariance principle. This principle states that equation (14) holds
irrespective of the choice of r∗s provided that equation (15) holds, namely,
the money borrowed/lent from derivatives not covered by collateral must be
taken from the Financial area. This means that the net amount of cash flows
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coming to the desk from the counterparty, the Financial area and the col-
lateral account is zero. Therefore, their remuneration rate, r∗s , is irrelevant
because a zero balance of net cash flows times any rate is still zero.
6 Invariance principle with default
The invariance funding principle including default risk needs to include the
cash flows corresponding to either the counterparty or the bank default. How-
ever, it is based on the same idea: the financing provided to counterparties
not covered by collateral must come from the Financial area: Fˆs = Vˆs −Ms.
Including credit risk yields equations (16) to (19) which are derived in ap-
pendix B (see also p. 20 of [7]), where d1{τC≤s} is the counterparty default
indicator at time s further explained in equation (52) of appendix B, V˜s is
the exit price on default, RCs is the recovery of the counterparty, τC and τB
are respectively the times to default of the counterparty and the bank and
τ = min(τC , τB) is the first to default time. See that as long as Fˆs = Vˆs−Ms
holds, r∗s can be arbitrarity chosen.
Vˆt1{τ>t} = V r∗t 1{τ>t} + ColV A
r∗
t + FV A
r∗
t + CV A
r∗
t +DV A
r∗
t
V r∗t = Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,sdCs
] (16)
ColV Ar∗t = Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,sMs
(
r∗s − rCs
)
1{τ>s}ds
]
FV Ar∗t = Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,sFˆs
(
r∗s − rFs
)
1{τ>s}ds
] (17)
CV Ar∗t = Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,s
(
HCs +Ms − V r∗s
)
1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}
]
DV Ar∗t = Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,s
(
HBs +Ms − V r∗s
)
1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s}
] (18)
HBs = (V˜s −Ms)+ +RBs (V˜s −Ms)−
HCs = R
C
s (V˜s −Ms)+ + (V˜s −Ms)−
(19)
The Collateral Value Adjustment (ColVA) and funding value adjustment
(FVA) terms provided by equation (17) come from equation (14). The only
change is that the calculation is conditioned by the fact that neither the
bank nor the counterparty default (see the indicator function 1{τ>s} inside
the integrands).
The Credit Value Adjustment (CVA) and Debit Value Adjustment (DVA)
terms provided by equation (18) account for the cash flows when either the
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bank or the counterparty default. The terms HCs and H
B
s given by equation
(19) and added to the collateral account, Ms, represent the default payments
of the counterparty and the bank at time s. The probability of a joint default
(both the counterparty and the bank defaulting simultaneously) is neglected.
See that when either the counterparty or the bank defaults, the collateral bal-
ance is always part of the default payment (the posted or received collateral
is never returned back in case of default).
Equation (19) shows that when the counterparty defaults, it only returns
back the recovery fraction of the money it owes to the desk: RCs (V˜s −Ms)+.
See that V˜s−Ms may be positive for two reasons: either the liquidity provided
to the counterparty (V˜s > 0) is not completely covered by the collateral
received by the desk (V˜s > Ms > 0) or the liability of the bank to the
counterparty (V˜s < 0) is overcollateralized (Ms < V˜s < 0) and from the
excess of posted collateral, only the recovery gets returned. See that the
money owed by the desk to the counterparty, (V˜s − Ms)−, is always fully
returned back when counterparty defaults.
Equation (19) also shows that when the bank defaults, it only returns back
the recovery fraction of the money it owes to the counterparty: RBs (V˜s−Ms)−.
Again, V˜s −Ms may be negative for two reasons: either the liability of the
desk to the counterparty, V˜s < 0, is not completely covered by the collateral
posted by the desk, V˜s < Ms < 0, or the money owed by the counterparty
to the desk, V˜s > 0, is overcollateralized (Ms > V˜s > 0) and from the excess
of collateral posted to the desk by the counterparty, only the recovery gets
returned when the bank defaults.
CV Ar∗t = Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,s
(
HCs +Ms − V r∗s
)
Es[1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}]
]
DV Ar∗t = Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,s
(
HBs +Ms − V r∗s
)
Es[1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s}]
]
FV Ar∗t = Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,sFˆs
(
r∗s − rFs
)
Es[1{τ>s}]ds
] (20)
Es[1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}] ≈ Es[1{τB>s}]Es[d1{τC≤s}] = e−
∫ s
t
(λCu +λ
B
u )duλCs ds
Es[1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s}] ≈ Es[1{τC>s}]Es[d1{τB≤s}] = e−
∫ s
t
(λCu +λ
B
u )duλBs ds
Es
[
1{τ>s}
]
≈ Es[1{τC>s}]Es[1{τB>s}] = e−
∫ s
t
(λCu +λBu )du
(21)
Finally, equation (18) shows the CVA and DVA terms which are dis-
counted with the arbitrarily chosen rate, r∗, multiplying by pr∗t,s. These pay-
ments are weighted by the indicator functions corresponding to the first to
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default being the counterparty for CVA (1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}) and the first to
default being the bank for DVA (1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s}). An example in which the
first-to-default effect may be important can be illustrated by the Regional
Communities of Spain. Their default is highly correlated with a default of
a Spanish bank. If the Regional Community defaults it is likely that the
government of Spain has already defaulted and this would also trigger the
default of the Spanish bank.
It is possible to apply the expectation conditioned by time s to the indi-
cator functions of equations (17) and (18) applying the Tower law as shown
by (20) as the rest of integrand terms are measurable by time s and can
get out of the expectation. Equations (21) show the expectations of these
indicator functions in terms of the hazard rates or default intensities2, λBu
and λCu , of the bank and the counterparty assuming independence between
the counterparty and the bank. The contribution of the indicator functions
in terms of the harzard rates for the Credit, Debit and Funding value adjust-
ment formulas have also been derived by [13] in the context of the resolution
of a partial differential equation. The most general case considers that haz-
ard rates and the rest of risk factors are jointly simulated to account for
the first-to-default effect and the correlation between market exposure and
default. The standard CVA/DVA computation usually considers determin-
istic hazard rates calibrated at time t . This implies ignoring the correlation
between market exposure and default (so called wrong/right way risk) and
the first-to-default effect. Some authors have analyzed the impact alone of
the first-to-default effect by the use of a copula approach (see [14] for more
information).
7 Math framework: objects of selection
This section presents the general framework to consistently calculate credit,
debit and funding value adjustments based on the principle of invariance (see
[1] and [7]). This framework is partially open to some objects of selection and
leads to a family of perspectives which are compatible within the framework.
These perspectives focus on how to account and manage these adjustments.
The common framework is defined by equations (16) to (19) where dif-
ferent perspectives may be achieved by choosing various objects of selection.
Although several perspectives may be included, consistency among them is
2Probability of default at time u provided survival prior to time u.
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provided by the reference equations. In particular, one perspective for ac-
counting purposes and another for internal management purposes will be
considered. These perspectives depend on the following objects of selection:
• The way to solve the equation (16): there is a circular relationship
as Vˆs, which includes the adjustments, depends on Fˆs which depends
itself on Vˆs. There are various ways to avoid this problem. Sections 8
and 9 address the particular way this circular dependence is avoided
for this framework.
• Curve selection: there are a number of curves which can be selected:
the curve associated with the principle of invariance, r∗s , the collateral
remuneration rate, rCs , and the funding rate charged by the Financial
area, rFs .
• Exit price: the selection of V˜s which is assumed to be the price at
which the derivatives can be sold to unwind the positions in case of
default. This selection may be conditioned by the way the circular
dependence in equation (16) is solved. The exit price is sometimes
calculated under the same valuation assumption as the variation margin
(e.g. OIS or risk-free discounting). However, many netting agreements
assume that liquidation is carried out at the replacement cost as valued
by a third party. This would include the default probability of the
surviving party3.
• Survival probabilities: equations (17) require bilateral survival of
the bank and the counterparty (see factor 1τ>s) and equations (18)
consider the first-to-default. Therefore, it has to be chosen which of
these hypotheses are included in the formulas to calculate the XVA
adjustments.
• Collateral optimisation: depending on whether the collateral can
be re-hypothecated and the ability of reusing collateral by the Securi-
ties Financing desk (see section 2.4), various options are available to
3A particular case for which there would be risk for the bank in case of counterparty
default would be for a position highly in favour of the bank with an unilateral CSA agree-
ment where the counteparty does not post collateral. If the exit price is OIS discounted,
the bank would expect to receive more as the replacement cost is always lower than the
risk free because the default of the surviving party (the bank) would reduce the price.
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choose the funding rate, rFs . These choices may reflect accounting or
management perspectives.
– Assume that funding rates are symmetric (positive and negative
balance of collateral gets remunerated/charged the same rate) and
common across counterparties. In this situation, the correct cal-
culation considering a single legal entity funding set aggregation
level including all the deals of every netting set, see equation (30)
is equivalent to the sum of the funding adjustments at netting set
level as expressed in equation (31). The latter approach is the
most common among institutions as their systems are not pre-
pared to consider a single funding set for the whole institution
instead of considering separate funding sets for each netting set.
Adding metrics at netting set level to obtain metrics at legal en-
tity level is always bigger than directly calculating metrics at legal
entity level.
– When collateral can be re-hypothecated and reused among all
counterparties, it is more reasonable to assume a symmetric fund-
ing rate for management purposes under the assumption that the
collateral provided by every CSA aggrement is jointly managed
by the Securities Financing desk and the funding rate is set to the
average rate which considers how excess of collateral is optimized
to reduce funding cost. A symmetric rate may also be considered
when the bank decides a rate to mark the funding adjustment for
accounting purposes (e.g. the liquidity curve shown in section 3).
– When collateral is not re-hypothecable or rates are not assumed
to be symmetric (e.g. there is not a Securities Financing desk
optimizing collateral), then from a management point of view,
the aggregation of FVA and ColVA has to be directly aggregated
at legal entity level considering a single funding set as indicated
by equation (31), where positive collateral balance is remunerated
at OIS and negative collateral balance gets charged the internal
cost of the bank.
These objects of selection share a common framework which is compatible
with various uses and perspectives. The bank has to decide which perspec-
tives are most convenient for best internally manage the bank or most satisfy
regulation for accounting purposes.
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8 Avoiding circular loop without default1
This section shows how the circular dependence presented in section 7 has
been solved for the invariance principle without default. The case with de-
fault is described in section 9.
To solve the circular dependence, the rate associated with the principle of
invariance, r∗s , is chosen to be r
F
s . This achieves cancelling the term involving
Fˆs in equation (14) and the circular dependence is avoided. However, this
is at the cost of having to discount every derivative in the systems with the
same rate rFs : V
rF
t = Et
[∫ T
t p
rF
t,sdCs
]
according to equation (22).
Vˆt = V
rF
t + Et
[∫ T
t
pr
F
t,s
[(
rFs − rCs
)
Ms
]
ds
]
(22)
As deals are discounted in valuation systems (sys) with another rate, rsys,
equation (23) relates rF and rsys discounting (see section 6.3 of [6]). This
equation has nothing to do with the invariance pricinple. It simply relates
two prices discounted with different rates. Appendix A shows the derivation
of this equation.
V r
F
t = V
rsys
t + Et
[∫ T
t
pr
F
t,sV
rsys
s
(
rsyss − rFs
)
ds
]
(23)
If equation (23) is replaced in equation (22) and assuming that F r
sys
s =
V rsyss − Ms, the equation (24) is obtained, which avoids the circular de-
pendence and also allows discounting with the rate, rsyss , used for marking
purposes within the internal pricing systems:
Vˆt = V
rsys
t + Et
[∫ T
t
pr
F
t,s
{
Ms
(
rsyss − rCs
)
+ F r
sys
s
(
rsyss − rFs
)}]
(24)
This equation calculates the collateral and funding value adjustments
avoiding the circular dependence and using directly the prices of the deriva-
tives which are already available in the pricing systems.
9 Avoiding circular loop with default1
This section presents the solution to avoid the circular loop but considering
default risk. This result is presented here under the assumption that the
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exit price in case of default is assumed to be the price marked in corporate
systems: V˜s = V
rsys
s . Under this hypothesis, the solution is given by equations
(25) to (27). Appendix C shows the derivation of these equations from the
equations (16) to (19) of the general framework presented in section 7.
Vˆt1{τ>t} = V r
sys
t 1{τ>t} − ColV Asyst − FV Asyst − CV Asyst −DV Asyst (25)
ColV Asyst = Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,sMs
(
rCs − rsyss
)
1τ>sds
]
FV Asyst = Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,sF
rsys
s
(
rFs − rsyss
)
1τ>sds
] (26)
CV Asyst = Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,s
(
1−RCs
) (
V r
sys
s −Ms
)+
1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}
]
DV Asyst = Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,s
(
1−RBs
) (
V r
sys
s −Ms
)−
1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s}
] (27)
See that the adjustments provided by equations (26) and (27) must be
discounted using the rate chosen for the principle of invariance, r∗s = r
F
s .
Now, F r
sys
s can be easily calculated as it depends on V
rsys
s which is available
in the systems. Equation (27) shows the well known formulas for CVA and
DVA depending on the recovery rates of counterparty and bank, RCs and
RBs , but with an exit price discounted with the discounting rate used in the
corporate systems. This is the major hypothesis of the particular solution
which has been chosen to solve equation (16).
Equations (25) to (27) are defined at deal level. However, the aggregation
levels which are considered in practice are CSA, netting set and legal entity.
Equation (28) shows the variation margin calculated at CSA level for the
deals corresponding to the perimeter of the CSA and at netting set level for
the CSA contracts included in the netting set.
MNSis =
∑
CSAj∈NSi
M
CSAj
s M
CSAj
s =
∑
Dealk∈CSAj
MDealks (28)
Equation (29) shows the mark-to-future position, V NSis , at netting set
level and the funding position, FNSis , in terms of the positions of mark-
to-future and variation margin, MNSis , at netting set level. See that V
NSi
s
includes the deals of every CSA contract and the deals which are outside the
CSA agreements of the netting set considered.
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FNSis = V
NSi
s −MNSis V NSis =
∑
Dealk∈NSi
V Dealks (29)
Equation (30) presents the funding position, FLEt , and the variation mar-
gin position, MLEs at legal entity level. They are obtained by summing across
netting sets.
FLEt =
∑
NSi∈LE
FNSis M
LE
s =
∑
NSi∈LE
MNSis (30)
CVA and DVA are defined at netting set level. Their calculation is carried
out using the mark-to-future and variation margin positions at netting set
level. Namely, replacing V r
sys
s by V
NSi
s and Ms by M
NSi
s in equation (27).
FVA and ColVA are defined at legal entity level. The calculation is carried
out using the funding and variation margin positions at legal entity level.
Namely, replacing F r
sys
s by F
LE
s and Ms by M
LE
s in equation (26).
In practice FVA and ColVA are calculated at netting set level by using
the funding and variation margin positions at netting set level. Namely,
replacing F r
sys
s by F
NSi
s and Ms by M
NSi
s in equations (26). The legal entity
level is thereafter obtained by summing FVA and ColVA across every netting
set of the legal entity according to equation (31).
FV ALEt =
∑
NSi∈LE
FV ANSis ColV A
LE
s =
∑
NSi∈LE
ColV ANSis (31)
See that the aggregation provided by equation (30) is only true when the
rates rCs and r
F
s are symmetric (the same irrespective of the sign of F
rsys
s or
Ms). If this is not the case, the correct calculation should be carried out
directly at legal entity level. This is something that the systems of most
institutions are not prepared for and constitutes an important limitation
especially for the calculation of FVA (Funding Value Adjustment) due to
the fact that without a Securities Financing desk the excess of collateral
(F r
sys
s < 0) is very likely to earn just the OIS rate rather than r
F .
10 Definition of accounting perspective
This section motivates and illustrates the objects of selection described in
section 7 for an accounting perspective. The accounting perspective is mo-
tivated by the current regulation which requires including CVA and DVA
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and maximize observable inputs (e.g. cost of own funding) for fair value
calculation:
• Fair value measurement of derivative instruments should include the
credit risk of their counterparty as well as their own credit risk (see
paragraphs 11, 42, 43 and 56 of [15] and section 1.1 of [16]).
• Methods for fair value measurement should maximise the use of observ-
able inputs and minimise the use of unobservable inputs (paragraph 61
of [15] and section 1.1 of [16]).
In addition, the current regulation requires to de-recognize DVA from
calculation of Common Equity Tier 1 capital (CET1):
• The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision establishes with regard
to derivative liabilities, to de-recognise all accounting valuation adjust-
ments arising from the bank’s own credit risk in the calculation of
Common Equity Tier 1 capital (see [17] and [18]).
Given these premises, a proposal for the objects of selection under an
accounting perspective could be the following:
• Solution of equation (16): r∗s = rFs and V˜s = V rsyss which yields
equations (25) to (27) as explained in section 6.
• Curve selection: rFs = r¯OISt,s + l¯Bt,s. The implications of this choice are
the following:
– The funding rate from the Financial area is set to the Fund Trans-
fer Pricing rate, rFs = r¯
FTP
t,s , according to equation (8). This se-
lection, as discussed in section 3, is set so that the Financial area
pays the recovery of the issued bonds in case of default of the bank
and the Financial area is not a profit center.
– The average liquidity, l¯Bt,s, of equation (8) can be replaced by a
market proxy (e.g. covered bond, bond-CDS basis of a basket
of market representative bonds). Therefore, this liquidity curve
would be observable.
– The credit default swap (CDS) contribution is also observable and
negligible, assuming that there is stability of the CDS. Namely,
current CDS is similar to the past average along the bond issuance
history.
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– With this selection there is no overlap between DVA (only con-
siders pure credit curve) and FVA (only consider a pure liquidity
curve). This non-overlapping idea is also discussed by [8].
• Exit price: it is set to the internal marking in systems: V˜s = V rsyss .
This choice is conditioned by the solution derived in section 6.
• Survival probabilities: unilateral survival for CVA/DVA. This im-
plies that CVA only considers the survival of the counterparty (the
indicators 1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s} of equation (27) are replaced by d1{τC≤s})
and the DVA only considers the survival of the bank (the indicators
1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s} of equation (27) are replaced by d1{τB≤s}). Although
this selection is not consistent with the framework (both survival of
counterparty and bank should be considered), it complies with ac-
counting regulation (adjustments arising from own credit risk of the
bank must be de-recognized from CET1 capital) and it is still bilateral
where price agreement may still be achieved if the counterparty also
considers unilateral CVA/DVA.
• Collateral optimisation: collateral is not optimised. Funding sets
are defined at counterparty level with a collateral remuneration rate
common for the whole legal entity, symmetric and equal to the liquidity
curve given by equation (8). This choice is observable and equivalent to
considering a single funding set for the legal entity and ColVA and FVA
metrics would be calculated at netting set level and summed together.
The rate rCs for the calculation of ColVA would simply consider the
remuneration of collateral of each CSA, which is usually symmetric.
The main contribution of this perspective is to report XVA metrics com-
parable among institutions. Therefore, they need to be bilateral so that
both the counterparty and the bank may agree on them and they have to
use observable market data.
11 Definition of management perspective
This section addresses a perspective of calculating XVA metrics which allows
the best practices for the internal management of the bank. These practices
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include properly fostering portfolio balance between CVA and DVA gener-
ating positions (see section 4) and hedging CVA and FVA risk. It is conve-
nient and desirable that the management perspective is also aligned across
institutions. Therefore, surveys are useful for aligning best practices. The
conclusions according to three surveys, [9], [10] and [11], published in 2017,
2018 and 2019, are the following:
• Institutions which use internal FTP rates from Financial area to mark
FVA similar to equation (11): 70% according to figure 10 of [10] and
60% according to page 3, question Q1 of [11].
• DVA is not highly used for profit and loss reporting: 82% as shown in
question Q6 of [9] and 75% looking at figure 4, P&L, of [10].
• DVA is reported in accounting statements: 60% according to question
Q7 of [9] and 70% as explained in figure. 4, P&L, of [10].
• Institutions which use symmetric FVA: 82% according to question Q6
of [9] and 80% as shown in figure 4, P&L, and figure 11 of [10]).
• 60% of funding sets are considered at counterparty level and 32% at
whole bank level as shown in question Q8 of [9])4.
• Institutions which hedge FVA: 50% according to figure 10 of [10] and
64% according to question Q21 of [11].
• Institutions which hedge FVA internally against the Financial area:
only 35% according to figure 10 of [10] and 54% according to question
Q21 of [11].
According to these surveys, market consensus is clearly trending to the
use of internal FTP rates, not including DVA in P&L formula, marking
with symmetric funding rates (same rate for borrowing and lending) and
hedging FVA against the financial area. Institutions still consider funding
sets at counterparty level instead of the legal entity level. Marking with
symmetric rates is most likely a convention rather than a fact (see [12]) as
monetizing funding benefit is only possible either by reducing bond issuance
4Both approaches are equivalent only if funding rate is symmetric. The sum of FVA
for every counterparty is equal to the FVA of a single funding set whose perimeter of deals
is the union of the perimeters for all counterparties
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(term funding against Financial area) or reusing excess of collateral through
the Securities Financing desk (see section 4) for other activities in the bank
such as posting initial margin, novate deals to more asset heavy, etc.
Given this information from market consensus, the management perspec-
tive assumes that the bank is itself default free. This hypothesis is also
assumed by FRTB-CVA regulation (see discussion of section 13). This fact
aligns the reduction of profit and loss risk due to XVA with the reduction of
CVA regulatory capital. A possible proposal of a management perspective
assuming that the bank cannot default is the following:
• Solution of equation (16): r∗s = rFs and V˜s = V rsyss which yields
equations (25) to (27) as explained in section 6. This is the same
solution adopted for the accounting perspective.
• Curve selection: rFs = r¯Bt,s =
NB∑
i=1
wi,tr
B
ti,s
. The implications of this
choice are the following:
– The funding rate from the Financial area is set to the average
yield of issued bonds, rFs = r¯
B
s , according to equation (11). This
selection, as discussed in section 3, assumes that the bank cannot
default. In practice rFs will be set to an average rate which takes
into account the FTP internal rates given by (11) and the col-
lateral optimisation carried out by the Securities Financing desk
(excess of collateral may get more remuneration than just the
overnight OIS rate).
– With this selection there is also no overlap between DVA and
FVA. DVA does not exist as bank default is not considered and
the FVA includes both the liquidity and credit components as the
average yield of the issued bonds includes them both.
• Exit price: it is set to the internal marking in systems: V˜s = V rsyss .
This choice is conditioned, similarly to the accounting perspective, by
the solution derived in section 6.
• Survival probabilities: as DVA disappears because bank default is
not considered, CVA turns naturally unilateral and FVA is discounted
by rFs = r¯
B
s , an average bond issuance cost curve.
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• Collateral optimisation: as already mentioned before, the Securi-
ties Financing desk optimizes re-hypothecable collateral to reuse it up
for instance 85% and determines an average symmetric rate rFs which
takes into account the optimization of collateral as a whole. With this
common symmetric rate, calculating funding sets for the legal entity or
for each counterparty netting set would be equivalent (the total FVA
would be the sum of FVA across every counterparty). The rate rCs for
the calculation of ColVA would simply consider the remuneration of
collateral of each CSA, which is symmetric.
The main contribution of this perspective is to foster appropriate manage-
ment of XVA by allowing portfolio balance between CVA and DVA generating
positions and hedging of CVA and FVA market risk as well as counterparty
default risk from CVA.
12 Comparison among both perspectives
This section compares the advantages and disadvantages of both accounting
and management perspectives. They have different uses and therefore they
address complementary parts of the XVA managing and reporting. The
advantages and disadvantages of the accounting perspective are the following:
• The XVA metrics and the fair value of derivative prices including ad-
justments are comparable among institutions as adjustments are bilat-
eral (include information of the both the bank and the counterparty)
and they are calculated with market observable data.
• Including CVA and DVA in profit and loss allows fostering balancing
CVA and DVA generating positions hedging one with the other.
• The main disadvantage of this perspective is that hedging counterparty
default and market funding risk is not possible:
– Hedging CVA default imbalances CVA/DVA compensation. There-
fore, the use of credit hedging products such as credit default
swaps, pass through swaps or risk participation agreements will
not allow offsetting risks.
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– The liquidity curve is up to some extent a theoretical construct
which is good for marking purposes. However, the exposure of the
metrics to the movement of this curve can be very material and
hedging it may not make a lot of sense.
– DVA cannot be hedged in practice.
The advantages and disadvantages of the management perspective are
the following:
• The main disadvantage of this approach is that fair value and XVA
metrics are not comparable among banks, as metrics are not bilateral
(DVA is absent) and depend on an unobservable internal funding cost
(the average price of bonds across the issuing history of the bank opti-
mized by the Securities Financing desk).
• CVA credit and market risk can be hedged as there is no DVA to
compensate CVA risk.
• FVA can be hedged with internal term operations between desk and
Financial area.
The fact that the management perspective does not provide comparable
prices among institutions (law of one price is broken) should not be a major
problem for the following reasons:
• There should not be great price discrepancies for operations between
big institutions as they will be fully collateralized and therefore the size
of the credit, debit and funding value adjustments will be small.
• The cases for which bigger discrepancies may appear correspond to
unsecured operations of usually non-financial institutions which will
accept the price provided by the other counterparty as they cannot
either effectively challenge the price or have access to an alternative
counterparty.
13 Comparison with FRTB-CVA regulation
The regulation establishes that market risk uncertainty should be covered by
an amount of capital currently given by the value-at-risk metric. This frame-
work will be replaced in the future by the FRTB or Fundamental Review of
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the Trading Book (see [19]) which calculates the expected shortfall instead of
the value-at-risk. For CVA, a separate value-at-risk calculation is currently
carried out and will be also replaced in January 2022 by what is called the
FRTB-CVA regulation (see [20]). The main objectives of this new regulation
are the following:
• Capture both credit and market risk factors when calculating regula-
tory CVA capital and recognize market risk hedging to reduce it.
• Align the regulatory CVA calculation formula with the fair value CVA
which is incorporated in the profit and loss (P&L) as shown in equation
(27). This means that the CVA formula used to calculate capital con-
siders the same risk neutral valuation formula as the CVA calculation
for P&L.
• Align regulatory CVA with FRTB calculation rules (see [19]). This
implies that the expected shortfall of the CVA is calculated through a
parametric method based on the sensitivities of the CVA with respect
to market and credit risk factors.
The analysis of the regulation concludes that the standard approach for
CVA calculation (FRTB-CVA) is well aligned with the management perspec-
tive for the following reasons:
• Regulatory CVA excludes bank own default from regulatory CVA cal-
culation (see paragraph 1 of [20]): this implies unilateral CVA without
DVA.
• Regulatory CVA is calculated with the same risk free implied market
calibration as P&L CVA (see paragraphs 31-34 of [20]).
• It recognizes market & credit hedges: reducing P&L risk implies re-
ducing CVA capital (see paragraph 37 of [20]).
The conclusion is that the regulation is pointing to the management per-
spective. In this context, the most sensible approach would be to align ac-
counting regulation with the management perspective so that the profit and
loss for internal management is the one reported for accounting purposes
(this is not currently the case as accounting regulation requires reporting of
CVA and DVA). However, in order to allow regulators to compare figures
among institutions, reporting of CVA and DVA figures calculated according
to the accounting perspective may be additionally required.
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14 Transition from accounting to management
According to sections 11 and 13, the market consensus and the regulatory
trends are pointing to the management perspective in the future. The impli-
cations of changing from the P&L formula (32) of the accounting perspective
to the P&L formula (33) of the management perspective are the following:
• The DVA profit is eliminated from the P&L (a loss must be realized).
• Funding cost increases as the average bank issuance yield (rF = r¯B)
given by equation (11) is higher than the average bond liquidity spread
(rF = r¯OIS + l¯B) given by equation (8). This implies that a bank with
a net asset position5 will have to realize a loss. On the other hand,
a bank with a net liability position may realize a profit, if benefit on
collateral excess can be monetized.
Vˆt = V
rsys
t −ColV Ar¯
OIS+l¯B
t −FV Ar¯
OIS+l¯B
t −CV Ar¯
OIS+l¯B
t −DV Ar¯
OIS+l¯B
t (32)
Vˆt = V
rsys
t − ColV Ar¯
B
t − FV Ar¯
B
t − CV Ar¯
B
t (33)
To implement the transition without negatively affecting shareholders,
benefits on new deals should be provisioned and the perspective switched
from the accounting formula (32) to the management formula (33) when this
provision exceeds the loss of the change of perspective. New deals should be
marked to funding curves which match market prices. For institutions with
heavy asset portfolios the transition implies a loss and marking positions to a
market transitioning to the management perspective will also reduce benefits
(as compared with a marking according to the accounting perspective). This
implies that in order to raise the transition loss, the provisioning period will
be longer with the associated business undermining.
15 Conclusions
Two paradigms or perspectives have been defined for consistent credit, debit
and funding value adjustment calculation which share the same mathemat-
ical framework and implementation but change the input parameters. The
5Counterparties owe money to the bank and bank must post collateral to hedge.
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accounting perspective considers that CVA, DVA and FVA, are aligned with
current accounting regulation and provides symmetric prices based on observ-
able market parameters comparable among institutions. The management
perspective only considers CVA and FVA, allows hedging of market risk fac-
tors and counterparty default but does not provide adjustments comparable
among institutions. Market consensus trends and FRTB-CVA regulation for
CVA capital calculation are pointing towards the management perspective.
However, there are still a considerable amount of participants which are either
in an accounting perspective or in the transition process to a management
perspective. For many institutions which have asset heavy portfolios (their
counterparties owe money to them), switching to a management perspective
implies a loss which justifies the resistance to complete the transition until
the accounting regulation and market consensus get more clearly clarified.
The mathematical framework presented in this paper provides an im-
proved solution for the equations of the principle of invariance in which it
is based. This allows the calculation of credit, debit and funding adjust-
ment metrics eliminating some approximations of the original paper [1] and
in terms of the exposures already available in the pricing systems irrespective
of the discounting curve chosen for their valuation.
The paper describes how the Financial area works and how balance sheet
financing is carried out. It also provides an illustration of how funding rates
can be estimated under the assumption that the Financial area is not a profit
center. For the accounting perspective in which it is assumed that the bank
can default, the conclusion is that the internal funding rate is approximately
equal to the average OIS rate plus the liquidity spread of the issued bonds
of the institution weighted by their issuance size. On the other hand, for
the management perspective in which it is assumed that the bank cannot
default, the internal funding rate is the optimized management rate based
on the internal FTP (Fund Transfer Pricing) rate and the funding savings
out of the collateral optimisation.
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A Relation between two discounted prices
This section shows the derivation of equation (23) which relates two prices
discounted with two different curves (in this case rF and rsys) through an
adjustment.
d
(
prt,sV
r
s 1{τ>s}
)
= prt,s (dVs − rsV rs ds) 1{τ>s} + prt,sV rs d1{τ>s} (34)
The left hand side of equation (34) shows the differential of the product of
the exponential term, prt,s, defined in (2), the stochastic price, Vs
r, discounted
by a generic curve r and the survival indicator function, 1{τ>s}, where τ is the
time of the first to default. Applying Ito’s Lemma to this product (second
derivatives are zero) and the fundamental theorem of calculus to the exponent
of the exponential yields the right hand side of equation (34).∫ ∞
t
d
(
prt,sV
r
s 1{τ>s}
)
= prt,sV
r
s 1{τ>s}
∣∣∣s→∞
s→t = −V
r
t 1{τ>t} (35)
∫∞
t d
(
prt,sV
r
s 1{τ>s}
)
=
∫∞
t p
r
t,s(dVs − rsV rs ds)1{τ>s} − prt,sV rs d1{τ≤s}
= −V rt 1{τ>t}
(36)
d1{τ>s} = 1{τ>s+ds} − 1{τ>s} = 1{s<τ≤s+ds} = −d1{τ≤s} (37)
Integrating the left hand side of equation (34) by applying Barrow’s rule
yields equation (35). Equation (36) arises from (34) and (35) after replacing
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d1{τ>s} = −d1{τ≤s} according to equation (37). If conditional expectations
are taken on equation (36), equation (38) is obtained. This equation will be
used later in this section and in appendix B to integrate the price conditioned
by the survival of the bank and the counterparty.
Et
[∫ ∞
t
prt,s(dV
r
s − rsV rs ds)1{τ>s} − prt,sV rs d1{τ≤s}
]
= −V rt 1{τ>t} (38)
Replacing equation (13) with r∗ = r in equation (38), taking the indicator
function inside the expectation as it is measurable at time t and reorganizing
yields equation (39). See that the indicator function multiplying dCs depends
on t and not on s as the other indicator functions of the integral.
Et
[∫ ∞
t
prt,s(dV
r
s − rsV rs ds)1{τ>s} − prt,sV rs d1{τ≤s} + 1{τ>t}dCs
]
= 0 (39)
To obtain the relation between two prices discounted with different rates,
the rate r of equation (39) is set to the two rates, rFs and r
sys
s , to relate with
each other and equation (39) is divided by prt,s. This yields equations (40)
and (41). See that in the latter equation, rFs is added and subtracted to the
parenthesis of the second term of the integrand with no effect.
Et
[∫ ∞
t
(dV r
F
s − rFs V rFs ds)1{τ>s}
−V rFs d1{τ≤s} + 1{τ>t}dCs
]
= 0 (40)
Et
[∫ ∞
t
(
dV r
sys
s − (rsyss + rFs − rFs )V rsyss ds
)
1{τ>s}
−V rsyss d1{τ≤s} + 1{τ>t}dCs
]
= 0 (41)
Now equation (41) is multiplied by−1 and added to equation (40) yielding
equation (42). The terms multiplying dCs cancel with each other.
Et
∫ ∞
t
(
d(V r
F
s − V rsyss )− rFs (V rFs − V rsyss )ds
)
1{τ>s}
−(V rFs − V rsyss )d1{τ≤s} + (rsyss − rFs )V rsyss 1{τ>s}ds
 = 0 (42)
If equation (42) is multiplied by pr
F
t,s , the terms multiplying 1{τ>s} and
d1{τ≤s} can be solved using equation (38) with V rs = V
rF
s − V rsyss yielding
equation (43).
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0 = −
(
V r
F
t − V r
sys
t
)
1{τ>t} + Et
[∫ ∞
t
pr
F
t,s(r
sys
s − rFs )V r
sys
s 1{τ>s}ds
]
(43)
Reorganizing terms yields equation (44). This is the expression to be
proved which relates two prices discounted with different curves.
V r
F
t 1{τ>t} = V
rsys
t 1{τ>t} + Et
[∫ ∞
t
pr
F
t,s(r
sys
s − rFs )V r
sys
s 1{τ>s}ds
]
(44)
V r
F
t = V
rsys
t + Et
[∫ ∞
t
pr
F
t,s(r
sys
s − rFs )V r
sys
s ds
]
(45)
If it is assumed that there is no default, τ → ∞, then the indicator
functions are always equal to one and equation (44) turns into equation (45).
B Derivation of invariance with default risk
This section shows the derivation of equations (16) to (18) of the mathemat-
ical framework common to both perspectives (see sections 10 and 11). The
starting point is the financing condition, ξs, of equation (46) which must be
satisfied at any time for the principle of invariance to hold. See section 5 for
the definition of these symbols.
ξs = Vˆs −Ms − Fˆs = 0 (46)
The evolution of the financing condition from time s to s+dsmay consider
three excluding scenarios: ξSs+ds when both the bank and the counterparty
survive, ξCs+ds when the counterparty defaults but the bank survives, ξ
B
s+ds
when the bank defaults but the counterparty survives and ξBCs+ds when both
simultaneously default. Equation (47) shows the financing condition at time
s + ds considering these scenarios discriminated by indicator functions. See
that the indicator functions are expressed in terms of the first to default time
τ = min(τC , τB), where τC and τB are the times to default of respectively
the counterparty and the bank.
ξSs+ds1{τ>s+ds} + ξ
C
s+ds1{s<τ≤s+ds,τ=τC} + ξ
B
s+ds1{s<τ≤s+ds,τ=τB}
+ξBCs+ds1{s<τ≤s+ds,τ=τB ,τ=τC} = 0
(47)
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1{s<τ≤s+ds,τ=τC} = 1{τB>s}1{s<τC≤s+ds} = 1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}
1{s<τ≤s+ds,τ=τB} = 1{τC>s}1{s<τB≤s+ds} = 1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s}
(48)
Under the assumption that simultaneous defaults cannot happen (they
happen one after another), the last term of equation (47) can be neglected
and the indicator functions can be simplified according to equation (48).
ξSs+ds1{τ>s+ds}+ξ
C
s+ds1{τB>s}1{s<τC≤s+ds}+ξ
B
s+ds1{τC>s}1{s<τB≤s+ds} = 0 (49)
ξSs+ds = Vˆs+ds + dCs −Ms(1 + rCs ds)− Fˆs(1 + rFs ds)
ξCs+ds = H
C
s+ds − Fˆs(1 + rFs ds)
ξBs+ds = H
B
s+ds − Fˆs(1 + rFs ds)
(50)
The value of the financing condition at time s+ds for the three scenarios
is shown in equation (49) where ξSs+ds, ξ
C
s+ds and ξ
B
s+ds are given by equation
(50). For the first scenario, the position on derivatives, Vˆ , takes the value
at s + ds plus the payments in the interval s to s + ds provided by dCs.
The term, Ms, associated with the collateral and the term, Fˆs, associated
with the financing, simply accrue the corresponding interest along the inter-
val. For the other two scenarios, the terms HCs+ds and H
B
s+ds are given by
equation (51) and account for the position on derivatives minus the collat-
eral amount at time s+ ds considering the default events. See that equation
(51) corresponds to equation (19) but evaluated at time s + ds with the al-
ready mentioned considerations of the evolution of derivatives and collateral
through the period from time s to s+ ds.
HCs+ds = R
C
s
(
V˜s+ds + dCs −Ms(1 + rCs ds)
)+
+(
V˜s+ds + dCs −Ms(1 + rCs ds)
)−
HBs+ds =
(
V˜s+ds + dCs −Ms(1 + rCs ds)
)+
+
RBs
(
V˜s+ds + dCs −Ms(1 + rCs ds)
)−
(51)
Equation (52) transforms the indicator functions of equation (49) in terms
of the differential of the indicator function (the unconditional default condi-
tion).
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1{s<τC≤s+ds} = 1{τC≤s+ds} − 1{τC≤s} = d1{τC≤s}
1{s<τB≤s+ds} = 1{τB≤s+ds} − 1{τB≤s} = d1{τB≤s}
1{τ>s+ds} = 1{τ>s} − 1{s<τ≤s+ds} = 1{τ>s} − d1{τ≤s}
(52)
In order to expresses the joint survival indicator in terms of the sur-
vival of the bank and the counterparty, the third line of equation (52) is
replaced in (53) and the result follows assuming that the joint default con-
dition (d1{τC≤s}d1{τB≤s}) is neglected.
1{τ>s+ds} = 1{τC>s+ds}1{τB>s+ds}
=
(
1{τC>s} − d1{τC≤s}
) (
1{τB>s} − d1{τB≤s}
)
≈
(
1{τ>s} − 1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s} − 1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}
) (53)
ξSs+ds1{τ>s} + (ξ
C
s+ds − ξSs+ds)1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}
+(ξBs+ds − ξSs+ds)1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s} = 0 (54)
Replacing equation (53) in (49) yields equation (54) where the indicator
functions no longer depend on s + ds. Now the dependence with respect to
s + ds is removed from ξs+ds terms by using differentials. Replacing Fˆs =
Vˆs−Ms in ξSs+ds, see equation (50), adding and subtracting the terms r∗sMsds
and r∗s Vˆsds, where r
∗ is the arbitrary rate of the principle of invariance and
knowing that dVˆs = Vˆs+ds − Vˆs, yields equation (55).
ξSs+ds = dVˆs − r∗s Vˆsds+ dCs +Ms(r∗s − rCs )ds+ Fˆs(r∗s − rFs )ds (55)
(ξCs+ds − ξSs+ds)1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s} = (HCs +Ms − Vˆs)1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}
(ξBs+ds − ξSs+ds)1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s} = (HBs +Ms − Vˆs)1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s}
(56)
HCs+dsd1{τC≤s} = (H
C
s + dH
C
s )d1{τC≤s} = H
C
s d1{τC≤s}
Vˆs+dsd1{τC≤s} = (Vˆs + dV˜s)d1{τC≤s} = Vˆsd1{τC≤s}
ds · d1{τC≤s} = 0
dCs · d1{τC≤s} = 0
(57)
The rest of the terms of equation (54) are presented in equation (56).
They were obtained from equation (50) assuming the simplifications shown
in equations (57). These simplifications are based on the fact that the product
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of two differential terms are negligible higher order infinitesimals. If these
terms are replaced in equation (54), the final transformed expression of the
funding condition is given by equation (58).
ξSs+ds1{τ>s} + (H
C
s +Ms − Vˆs)1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}
+(HBs +Ms − Vˆs)1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s} = 0
(58)
∫∞
t p
r∗
t,s
(
dVˆs − r∗s Vˆsds+ dCs
)
1{τ>s} − pr∗t,sVˆsd1{τ≤s} + pr∗t,sVˆsd1{τ≤s}
+
∫∞
t p
r∗
t,sMs(r
∗
s − rCs )1{τ>s}ds+ pr∗t,sFˆs(r∗s − rFs )1{τ>s}ds
+
∫∞
t p
r∗
t,s
(
HCs +Ms − Vˆs
)
1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}
+
∫∞
t p
r∗
t,s
(
HBs +Ms − Vˆs
)
1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s} = 0
(59)
If equation (55) is replaced in (58), the resulting expression is multiplied
by pr∗t,s, the term p
r∗
t,sVˆsd1{τ≤s} is added and subtracted and the whole expres-
sion is integrated from time t to infinity, expression (59) is obtained.
d1{τ≤s} = 1{s<τ≤s+ds,τ=τC} + 1{s<τ≤s+ds,τ=τB} + 1{s<τ≤s+ds,τ=τC ,τ=τB}
≈ 1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s} + 1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s} (60)
Taking expectation, Et(·), conditioned on time t in equation (59) and
replacing equation (38) with r = r∗ on the first line of (59) would collapse the
first, second and fourth terms of the integrand into −Vˆs1{τ>s}. In addition,
if the differential d1{τ≤s} of the fifth term of the integrand is replaced by
equation (60)6, this term cancels the −Vˆs component inside the parenthesis
of the third and fourth lines of equation (59), the CVA and DVA terms.
Finally, the second line of equation (59) can be replaced by the collateral
and funding adjustments of equation (17). The final result is presented in
equation (61).
−Vˆs1{τ>s} + Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,sdCs1{τ>s}
]
+ ColV Ar∗t + FV A
r∗
t
+Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,s
(
HCs +Ms
)
1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}
]
+Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,s
(
HBs +Ms
)
1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s}
]
= 0
(61)
6The first to default indicator condition between s and s + ds is expressed as the sum
of the first to default of the counterparty plus the first to default of the bank plus the joint
default which is neglected. See equation (48) to understand the final result.
45
In order to calculate the second term of equation (61), dCs is expressed
in terms of Vs discounted by the rate r
∗
s through equation (13) applied to the
rate r∗ and equation (38) assuming τ →∞. This yields equation (62):
dV r
∗
s − r∗sV r
∗
s ds+ dCs = 0 (62)
The calculation of the second term of equation (61) is shown in equation
(63) and it is obtained by replacing equation (62) in this second term and
adding and subtracting pr∗t,sV
r∗
s d1{τ≤s}.
Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,sdCs1{τ>s}
]
=
= −Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,s(dV
r∗
s − r∗sV r∗s ds)1{τ>s} − pr∗t,sV r∗s d1{τ≤s} + pr∗t,sV r∗s d1{τ≤s}
]
= V r∗t 1{τ>t} − Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,sV
r∗
s d1{τ≤s}
]
(63)
Once more, replacing equation (38) with r = r∗ in the second line of
equation (63) would collapse the first, second and third terms of the integrand
into −V r∗t 1{τ>t} yielding the third line of equation (63).
Vˆt1{τ>t} = V r∗t 1{τ>t} + ColV A
r∗
t + FV A
r∗
t
+Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,s
(
HCs +Ms − V r∗s
)
1{τB>s}d1{τC≤s}
]
+Et
[∫∞
t p
r∗
t,s
(
HBs +Ms − V r∗s
)
1{τC>s}d1{τB≤s}
] (64)
Finally, if equation (60) is replaced in (63) and the result replaced in
equation (61), the final expression (64) equal to equation (16) to be proved
follows.
C Improved solution for XVA calculation
This appendix shows the hypotheses and transformations carried out to ob-
tain equations (25) to (27) of section 9 after solving the circular dependence
and choosing V r
sys
s as exit price, from the general equations (16) to (19) of
the invariance principle with default risk (see section 6).
The starting point is the equation (16) of the invariance principle with
default risk. The rate r∗, which can be arbitrarily chosen without affecting
the pricing equation (16), is set to the funding rate, rF , so that the term
FV Ar∗t turns to zero. This breaks the circular dependence as the right hand
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side of equation (65) no longer depends on Vˆ and equation (16) becomes
(65).
Vˆt1{τ>t} = V r
F
t 1{τ>t} + ColV A
rF
t + CV A
rF
t +DV A
rF
t (65)
If equation (44) is substituted in equation (65), the ColV Ar
F
t term com-
bines with the last adjustment term of equation (44) according to equation
(66). See that the third line of this equation is obtained by adding and sub-
tracting the integrand term pr
F
t,sMs(r
sys
s − rFs )1{τ>s}ds to the second line and
taking into account that F r
sys
s = V
rsys
s −Ms. The fourth line of equation (66)
is obtained by replacing the definitions given by equation (26). Replacing
this calculation in equation (65) yields equation (67).
ColV Ar
F
t + Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,sV
rsys
s (r
sys
s − rFs )1{τ>s}ds
]
=
= Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,sMs(r
F
s − rCs )1{τ>s}ds+ prFt,sV rsyss (rsyss − rFs )1{τ>s}ds
]
= Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,sMs(r
sys
s − rCs )1{τ>s}ds+ prFt,sF rsyss (rsyss − rFs )1{τ>s}ds
]
= −ColV Asyst − FV Asyst
(66)
Vˆt1{τ>t} = V r
sys
t 1{τ>t} − ColV Asyst − FV Asyst + CV Ar
F
t +DV A
rF
t (67)
CV Ar
F
t = Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,s
(
HCs +Ms − V rFs
)
1{τ>s}d1τC≤s
]
= Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,s
(
HCs +Ms − V rsyss
)
1{τ>s}d1τC≤s
]
=
= −Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,s(1−RCs )(V rsyss −Ms)+1{τ>s}d1τC≤s
]
= −CV Asyst
(68)
DV Ar
F
t = Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,s
(
HBs +Ms − V rFs
)
1{τ>s}d1τB≤s
]
= Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,s
(
HBs +Ms − V rsyss
)
1{τ>s}d1τB≤s
]
= −Et
[∫∞
t p
rF
t,s(1−RBs )(V rsyss −Ms)−1{τ>s}d1τB≤s
]
= −DV Asyst
(69)
Setting the rate r∗ = rF and the exit price V˜s = V r
sys
s for the CVA and
DVA terms of equation (67) and replacing V r
F
s in terms of V
rsys
s according
to equation (44) yields equations (68) and (69). See that when V r
F
s is re-
placed according to equation (44), the term V r
sys
t continues to appear within
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the parenthesis of the second line of equations (68) and (69) but the adjust-
ment term disappears. Equation (70) shows that the contribution of this
adjustment term for the CVA equation is zero due to the fact that d1{τC≤s}
is measurable with respect to time s getting inside the expectation and the
product of differentials, dsd1τC≤s, is negligible. The transformation of the
terms inside the parenthesis of the second line of equation (68) are explained
by equation (71), where the term (V r
sys
s −Ms)+ is added and subtracted so
that combining positive and negative parts cancels the term Ms−V rsyss . The
same approach is carried out for the DVA equation. The final expression for
the parenthesis inside the CVA and DVA integrands is presented in equation
(72).
Et
(∫ ∞
t
Es
[∫ ∞
s
pr
F
s,uV
sys
u (r
sys
u − rFu )1{τ>u}du
]
· d1{τC≤s}
)
= 0 (70)
HCs +Ms − V rsyss = RCs (V rsyss −Ms)+ + (V rsyss −Ms)−
+(V r
sys
s −Ms)+ − (V rsyss −Ms)+ +Ms − V rsyss (71)
HCs +Ms − V rsyss = −(1−RCs )(V rsyss −Ms)+
HBs +Ms − V rsyss = −(1−RCs )(V rsyss −Ms)− (72)
Vˆt1{τ>t} = V r
sys
t 1{τ>t} − ColV Asyst − FV Asyst − CV Asyst −DV Asyst (73)
Replacing equations (68) and (69) in equation (67) yields the expression
(73) to be proved, equal to equation (25).
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